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The fir st version of this paper was written for a 1990 conference at the University 
of Kansas entitled "Ikë s America." It was an interesting event—though flawed 
somewhat by the organizers' decision to schedule sessions and design program 
flow according to academic category. Eminently sensible from an administrative 
standpoint, this arrangement worked counter to the articulated aim of stimulating 
interdisciplinary dialogue by encouraging participants to spend all their time 
hanging out with birds of their own feather—economists with economists, 
historians with historians, literati with literati. Like many of the would-be 
innovative conferences, symposia, andevenfull-scale academic programsmounted 
over the last decade, this one was multi- rather than truly inter-disciplinary. This 
didn' t mean that I wasn t able to find any critical grist for my mill. Substantive 
aspects aside, the two things I found most intriguing about what I heard during 
those few days were, first, the number and variety of people who had recently 
"rediscovered" the fifties, and second, the extent to which the pattern of their 
rediscovery paralleled my own. Arriving there convinced I had made a major 
breakthrough in elucidating the darker and more complex feelings that 
undercolored the broadly presumed conservatism of the decade, what I heard 
over and over again from presenter s was the same (gleeful or earnest) revisions, 
the same sense of surprise at how much had been overlooked. Two messages 
might be taken from this. The first is that the fifties is suddenly relevant again. 
The second and perhaps more sobering concerns the mind-boggling power of 
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American culture to foster an almost complete collective amnesia about events 
and attitudes of the not-very-distant past. It was the latter consideration in 
particular that led me to expand my essay (intended originally as a book chapter) 
into something suitable for journal publication. 
The decision was not without its risks. Generalizing as it does on a very wide 
front, this paper is likely to arouse the ire of fifties specialists of every stripe and 
hue. And not just fifties specialists, either. National identity has been a 
unfashionable topic of late. The same people who talk blithely of mega-entities 
like "postmodernism" or "late capitalism" are accustomed to label any gener-
alization about historic America as unconscionably reductionist. It's easy, of 
course, to see the basis for this. National culture studies—a major genre in the 
post-war reconstruction of American intellectual life—lost their goes-without-
saying status way back in the seventies when we began to realize the extent to 
which the notion of national community obscured issues of class, gender and 
race. Now the danger is running the other way. Dividing the thinkable world into 
the two widely disparate realms of transnational for ces and grass-roots plurality, 
we no longer have any vantage for elucidating either the concept or the influence 
of "place. " What I would like to propose is that if s high time for the meso-scale 
account to be revived again,1 not because it's "truer" than those currently 
fashionable (it's important to remember that histories are always partial, and 
scales always arbitrary, no matter how natural and worthy their proponents may 
make them seem), but simply because of the extent to which it has been neglected 
of late. And at what cost. Generalizations notwithstanding, the fact is that the 
kind of "story" adumbrated here is critical to our historical understanding. 
Without it we have no context, no way to bridge the gap between micro andmacro, 
no explanation for either the local variability of ostensibly universal givens like 
capitalism and patriarchy QT the commonalities which link and constrain the 
ostensibly random phenomena—lives, texts, objects, events—comprising Ameri-
can social reality. It1 s that breach I aim to fill with this work. Note, though, the 
tentativeness of my reference to adumbration. One thing I want to make clear: 
I am far from claiming that what I tell in these pages is the whole or the real or 
the only story possible. Perhaps, indeed, the word story is too decorous a term 
altogether for something as synthetic as this essay, with its procrustian catego-
ries, its impressionistic rereadings, and its reliance on cultural representations 
rather than "real" (embodied, historic, accountable) experience.2 Given that my 
intent is less to provide new information than to destabilize old assumptions, it 
would possibly be more appropriate to call it a "provocation." 
$ * $ $ * * # 
If decades can be said to have characters, on virtually all axes the forties and the 
sixties would seem to have been polar opposites. Judging by the images purveyed 
in cultural products, these two periods in American history may be seen as 
exemplifying the defining ends of practically every dichotomy invoked by post-
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war critics in the once-hot debate over the country's social bimodalism.3 Over the 
scant space of ten years the popular imagination clearly shifted its point of 
reference one hundred and eighty degrees: from culture to nature, from history to 
myth, from law to desire, from formalism to wilfulness, from hierarchy to 
communalism—in short, from a progressive to a primitivistic world view. Since 
change of this magnitude rarely occurs unheralded, common sense suggests that 
the fifties must in some sense have mediated between these extremes. Given the 
consensus of popular wisdom about the decade's social conservatism,4 however, 
it is difficult to avoid the general impression that the change, when it came, was 
both abrupt and catastrophic. "After 1960," says Peter Filene, "the era of tranquil 
domesticity dissolved into hurly-burly scenes of rebellion."5 The suddenness 
implicit in this quotation was, in fact, an illusion. If one makes the effort to get 
past three decades worth of nostalgia about that "happy, simple, placid time," 
what emerges from any reexamination of the fifties, as Ronald Oakley points out, 
isnotitsseamlessnessbutitsparadoxes. "Itwas... an age of great optimism along 
with the gnawing fear of doomsday bombs, of great poverty in the midst of 
unprecedented prosperity, of flowery rhetoric about equality along with the 
practice of rampant racism and sexism."6 Most pertinent to the subject at hand, 
as one may easily infer from the more thoughtful histories of the period,7 it was 
an age that gave birth to both the ruptures and the icons that would "make" the 
sixties. 
How? Consider the much-insisted-upon feature of conformity, for instance. 
There is no doubt that the fifties was a conformist era. The growth of consum-
erism,8 the rush to the suburbs,9 the emergence and enshrinement of professional 
and managerial elites10: such factors not only promoted social homogenization 
but, in combination with Cold War atomic paranoia,11 triggered the fear that 
differentness of any stripe—sexual, political, sartorial—was symptomatic of 
disaffection, even disease.12 People were not conformist during the fifties 
because they thought it was a "good thing," therefore, but because they were 
afraid not to be. And they knew Ms. Quite contra the popular image of happy 
sheep, the pressure to conform was almost universally decried by contemporane-
ous commentators as a symptom of national malaise. Sitting oddly with the 
emphasis on consensus in post-war historiography ,13 much of the "most insightful 
writing" of the period, as Elaine May points out, took as its subject the dehuman-
izing effects of the "mass, impersonal white-collar world."14 
The same kind of discrepancy undercuts what we "know" about fifties 
innocence and complacency. While it's true that the official line of the time 
stressed the benefits of affluence, it is notable that bestselling novels, especially 
after mid-decade, were as likely to treat success as a problem as to propose it as 
a desirable goal.15 Judging by the subtext to popular genres of the period, there 
was also a good deal of uneasiness about the structures that enabled the 
purportedly universal prosperity. Science fiction produced vicious satires of 
corporate society.16 Westerns transformed the imperiled community into the 
corrupt one.17 Gangster films replaced the Robin Hood anti-heroes of the thirties 
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with a new syndicated version,18 which at its worst, in the form of the faceless 
cartel or cabal, took on the sinister semblanceof big business or big government19 
Such productions do not bespeak a smug faith in the status quo. Far from 
complacency, in fact, it is clear from the "enormous outpouring of literature about 
totalitarianism'* during the fifties that a significant fraction of the population felt 
they were "living in an 'age of anxiety.'"20 And I'm not just talking about 
intellectuals here. Conspiracy, dystopia, wasteland—media paeans notwith-
standing, by the end of the decade it was images like these that had come to 
dominate both cinematic and literary depictions of American society.21 What 
they tell us, among other things, is that criticisms of fifties social regressiveness 
are in at least one sense misplaced. The rush to marry and buy homes, the 
reinscription of traditional gender roles, and the overinsistence on the pleasures 
of family life were less signs of self-satisfaction than defenses against uncer-
tainty.22 The world inhabited by the man in the grey flannel suit, says Elizabeth 
Long, is "problematic, fragmented... full of conflicting memories, responsibili-
ties and demands."23 
The view from the fifties was not, then, quite as benign as posthumous 
reconstructions (American Graffiti, "Happy Days") have led us to believe. The 
commonest sources of concern, moreover, were exactly those themes that would 
eventually underwrite the great withdrawal of the sixties: materialism, bureau-
cracy, social regimentation. It was not only the substance of critique that laid the 
ground for later developments, however; the very terms in which disquiet was 
expressed, regardless of intent, were such as to make revision almost inevitable. 
One of the key culprits here, ironically, was the anti-communist rhetoric that 
dominated the communal narrative for the first half of the decade.24 In its 
insistence on group purity and traditional values, this discourse would seem to 
have been—and certainly we now view it as—one of the most regressive political 
formations of recent history. In its attack on the actual, however (one thinks here 
of McCarthy ' s hammering and repetitive characterizations of modernday America 
as compromised, effete, and riddled with corruption), it was as damaging to 
establishment credibility as the mosthard-hitting social satire. McCarthy was not 
alone in his thinking. Liar he may have been, opportunist he certainly was,25 but 
the reason he succeeded in his machinations was that his "vision"—not just his 
paranoia26—struck a chord with the country at large. The same pattern is 
reiterated over and over throughout fifties popular fictions: not yet a rejection of 
transcendent values, but an attack on the society that had failed to live up to them.27 
It is implicit in the burgeoning appetite for escape—the predilection for frontier 
settings in advertising,28 the rise of the TV western,29 the popularity of cinematic 
epics that salvaged American ideals by dissociating them from the now-suspect 
context of American society.30 It is evident most of all in the switching of 
emphasis and value in almost all strands of communal discourse from the public 
realm to the private one. Fifties movies "retreat into fairy tale or romance," says 
Michael Wood. They deal with the "social questions lurking in forties films .. 
. by leaping over them and looking the other way."31 Such trends have been 
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interpreted, especially by feminist critics, as confirming the insularity and 
repressiveness of fifties culture. Viewed from a slightly different perspective, 
however, they can be seen as anticipating the sixties canonization of the 
individual as not merely the carrier but the measure of social ideals.32 
Countering initial impressions, then, what emerges at closer quarters is that 
the fifties did, in fact, shift significantly toward the primitivistic pole of the 
aforementioned dichotomy. Certainly the pastoral saw a considerable revival. 
Westerns not only flourished but also changed during the period, becoming more 
lyrical, more serious, and more ambivalent about the civilizing process.33 In line 
with this trend, Indians began to be treated more seriously too, attaining in films 
like Broken Arrow and Cheyenne Autumn a nobility and complexity they had not 
been allowed since the days of James Fenimore Cooper.34 This was not an isolated 
recuperation. Suddenly noble savage types began to appear everywhere, in every 
guise—from Bellows' princely blacks through Salinger's children35 to the ethnic/ 
proletarian fool-saints of popular film and TV.36 Whatever their specifics, figures 
like these were definitely on the nature side of the fence.37 
This brings us to an issue I skipped over earlier. Another, and indeed perhaps 
the key, marker for the culture/nature dichotomy in American tradition is the 
opposition between masculine and feminine. Given the quite palpable turn to 
nature, therefore, it is not surprising to note signs of a new concern with 
femaleness during the fifties. These are not all positive by any means. The 
prevalence of "feminine" monsters in horror films,38 the association of women 
with mental disorders,39 the almost claustrophobic introversion of domestic 
melodrama40—all of these usages clearly reveal that the return of the feminine 
repressed was viewed with considerable ambivalence. That it was returning, 
though, seems certain. Given the conventional symbolic links (via nature) 
between femaleness and libidinality,41 the much-documented fifties obsession 
with sex42 is in itself strong evidence of a shift in orientation. But there are plenty 
of other, less obvious indicators available if we make the effort to "read" culture 
whole. Viewed singularly, for instance, the refeminization of women's clothing 
and especially the emphasis on mammary development may be taken simply as 
one more evidence of patriarchal repression.43 This authorized explanation is at 
leastincipiently destabilized, however, when we note, inRebeccaBell-Mettereau's 
fascinating study of cross-dressing in American film, that the late fifties saw the 
beginnings of a boom in sympathetic female impersonations (Billy Wilder's 1959 
comedy, Some Like It Hot, is a landmark here), while during the same period male 
impersonations disappeared almost completely.44 We might similarly read the 
preoccupation with Freud, not—or not merely—as evidence for the overvaluation 
of social regulation,45 but as the rationalization of apreoccupation with interiority. 
"Feminineness" may have been a socially disadvantaged category during the 
fifties, but it is clear from the cultural configuration that it was also in some sense 
a symbolically privileged one. 
From all this it would seem that fifties culture did function at least in some 
aspects as a mediator between the forties and the sixties, generating a variety of 
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signs modelling the transition from a progressivist to a primitivistic era. Note, 
however, the qualifier embedded in this sentence. Other aspects seem to point in 
totally different directions. Particularly troubling is the corollary to that last 
statement about symbolic privilege. If feminineness achieved a certain cachet by 
the end of the decade, there is ample both hard and textual data to establish that 
females, real and symbolic, had suffered an opposite fate. The past perfect tense 
here was chosen advisedly. What needs to be underlined in all this is the fact that 
the phenomenon we're dealing with is both time-specific and local. This is 
something that many commentators overlook. Gaye Tuchman, for instance, 
comments on the "symbolic annihilation of women in the mass media" as if it 
were a constant.46 What's interesting and depressing, however, is precisely the 
fact that it's not. Late thirties-through-forties cinema, for instance, produced a 
striking lineup of strong, dynamic women characters—not entirely liberated, 
perhaps, but interesting and potent nevertheless.47 This makes it all the more 
significant that fifties cinema came very close to wiping this type from its 
repertoire. The "most socially ambitious cinematic probes of the decade," notes 
Marjorie Rosen, were "totally devoid of females . . . . 'Women's films,'" 
meanwhile, "divorced themselves from controversial and timely plots and 
became 'how to's' on catching and keeping a man."48 
How do we explain this contradiction—the fact that "the feminine" could 
thrive during a period and woman not? How, even more, do we account for the 
paradox that during the sixties, a decade that saw the most striking upsurge of neo-
primitivism in a century,49 the heroine disappeared from American popular 
culture almost completely? "Of the five top-rated dramatic shows of the 1960-
61 [television] season," notes Diana Meehan, "only one, Gunsmoke, featured a 
regular female character." The only guise in which women turned up regularly 
in the programming of this period, she continues, was that of the victim, a feckless 
"innocent" who provided the hero with his excuse to aggress by getting herself 
"robbed, raped, mugged, beaten, kidnapped, and killed."50 In popular cinema the 
situation was similar. "In the roles and prominence accorded women," says Molly 
Haskell, "the decade began unpromisingly [and] grew steadily worse . . . The 
growing strength and demands of women in real life, spearheaded by women's 
liberation, obviously provoked a backlash in commercial film: a redoubling of 
Godfather-like machismo to beef up man's eroding virility or, alternately, an 
escape into the all-male world of the buddy film."51 The sixties were even guiltier 
than the fifties, then, when it came to the sidelining of women. Is Haskell right, 
though, in blaming the backlash against feminism? I don't think so. Backlash 
may have been part of it; escapism certainly was—but the roots of the develop-
ment lie elsewhere. In order to determine the real significance of the fifties-
through-sixties ambivalence about femaleness—and this issue literally under-
writes the aforementioned mediation—it is necessary to consider more critically 
the difference between the symbolic and mimetic functions of gender represen-
tations. The best way to do this is to examine specific changes in the fifties 
imaging of familial roles and relations. 
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Fathers 
One of the most characterizing features of the sixties was its rejection of authority. 
Recently I heard someone call it an era of symbolic parricide. If I'm right about 
the mediating function of culture, then, we may expect to find in the texts of the 
preceding decade at least some intimations of negative feelings toward the father. 
The most obvious evidence for such a development would be a proliferation of 
villainous patriarchs across the oeuvre. In actuality, such open attacks on the 
institution were relatively uncommon, at least until the closing years of the 
decade. One of the clearest intimations we get of the anxiety aroused by the issue, 
in fact, is the effort that was made to ignore or deny it. It is telling in this respect 
that apart from a few false father figures (The Night of the Hunter, with a 
marvelously menacing Robert Mitchum as the psychotic ex-con-cum-preacher 
on the trail of his fleeing stepchildren, offers perhaps the most memorable 
example of this typos), almost every "bad dad" in fifties fictions is either 
"excused" or offset by a more positive exemplar. If the urge to resist is there, in 
other words—and certainly this much is palpable in the melodrama of the 
period—so is the fear of it: "Split between madness and authority," as D.N. 
Rodowick puts it, the text is unable "to evolve as either a fully affirmative or fully 
subversive form."52 
If the overtly villainous father is a rarity, on the other hand, the covertly 
negative one is definitely not. One type we see frequently during the period, for 
instance, is the father who sins not actively but by omission. The shallow 
materialist of Some Came Running,53 the cold, too saintly sire of East of Eden, the 
hen-pecked blowhard of Rebel Without a Cause: each of these characters injures 
a child not because of something he does, but because of something he doesri t 
give—strength, guidance, protection, even simple love.54 Common, too, is the 
feudal patriarch or captain of industry whose predatory behavior outside the home 
compromises his ability to function paternally inside.55 Most common of all, 
though—significantly enough—is the father who damages his offspring inad-
vertently, as if his malign effect were simply a byproduct of his position as father. 
In some cases, like Written on the Wind, this typos is technically "innocent" of 
wrongdoing; in others, hkcEast of Eden, he is culpable at least for his remoteness. 
Benign or despicable, however, the character of the incidentally bad dad is less 
important than his mere being: the cause of familial discord is virtually always 
related to his de facto opposition to "feminine" qualities or categories. Exemplary 
here is Home from the Hill. Already coded as anti-feminine by his separation from 
his wife and his symbolic association with guns (the technologized phallus) and 
"hunting," when Wade Hunicutt gets in the way of his son's marriage, thus 
"interfer[ing] with [a] successful resolution of the [boy's] Oedipus complex," he 
makes explicit his function in both filmic and familial economy as an obstacle to 
"natural" sexuality.56 
Symbolic alignments aside, it is also noteworthy that the last-named father 
has a better relationship with his illegitimate son than with his legal one. Over and 
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over during this period what we see in popular fictions is a deranging of 
relationships in such a way that "legitimacy" serves more as a detriment to, than 
a guarantor of, familial continuity. Just as it is the bachelor uncle who has to play 
the paternal protector in Some Came Running, it is left to the outsiders—the 
"adopted" son, the daughter-in-law—to model proper filial deportment in Writ-
tenin the Wind. Despite the strikingly bad behavior of the "real" son and daughter 
in this latter film, however—and despite, too, the father's best intentions—it is 
telling that the trouble is still at least indirectly attributable to a failure of paternity. 
The fact that the true offspring are both precluded by libidinal excess (their 
addictions to alcohol and sex respectively) from fulfilling the role that the 
patriarchal imperative assigns—that is, either submitting to or becoming the 
father's replacement—clearly augurs ill for the survival of the lineage.57 Regard-
less of individual culpability, familial breakdown is in the end the father's 
responsibility—in short, his fault. Such covert "blaming" of dad for general ills 
is typical of this period. Indeed, the one thing that sets fifties melodrama most 
clearly apart from previous versions is its tendency to make paternal influence the 
source rather than the arbiter of problems. "[W]here the melodramatic Father 
formerly functioned to legitimate the system of conflict and guarantee its 
resolution by successfully identifying its heroes on the side of the law, morality, 
and authority," says Rodowick, "in the 1950s he functioned solely to throw the 
system into turmoil by his absences... his weaknesses, his neglects."58 
The distrust of paternal influence shows up with equal clarity in the way that 
fifties fictions depict their public fathers. Particularly telling here is the realign-
ment from pro- to anti-militarism that we may detect in war films of the period. 
The shift was not, admittedly, either as sudden or as unanimous as that blanket 
statement makes it sound. Throughout the decade, notes Adrian Turner, films 
ranged "from the self-conscious liberalism of. . . The Bridge on the River Kwai 
... to the jingoistic The Steel Helmet."59 One factor Turner sees as underwriting 
these extremes of stance is "historical distance." While Korean war stories (The 
Flying Leathernecks, The Bridges at Toko-Ri) continued to stress sacrifice and 
patriotism, he says, stories set in World War II (Paths of Glory, The Desert Fox) 
were typically marked by a considerable ideological softening. Another factor 
not noted by Turner, however, is the temporal one. While a film as classically 
affirmative as Never So Few (the title says it all) could still appear as late as 1959, 
there was a perceptible trend over the period toward a greater questioning of 
authority. Though resolving the problem quickly with the introduction of a 
fatherly deus ex machina, evznNever So Few casts seeds of doubt about the chain 
of command by opening up the possibility of political betrayal. Other films went 
further by far. Attack!, for instance, a 1955 entry focusing on the combat 
experiences of a platoon in the Ardennes, is described by Jeanine Basinger as 
consciously undermining "established genre conventions . . . by telling of 
corruption, desire for political power, incompetence, and, above all, coward-
ice."60 It is not only the theme that makes this picture portentous. Though it is 
by no means meant to be funny, there is (in Turner's words) "a vivid sense of the 
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absurd about it" which anticipates strikingly the anti-war black comedies of the 
early seventies. 
It is, of course, in those films where authority is most clearly personalized 
that the father is most clearly impugned. From the venal Captain Holmes {From 
Here to Eternity) to the obsessive Captain Queeg (The Caine Mutiny), the military 
imaged by the fifties is rife with authority figures who, far from protecting, 
demean and endanger the men under their command. The flawed leader was not, 
to be sure, an invention of the fifties. The classic version of Mutiny on the Bounty, 
for instance, was made in 1935. Closer to base, the 1948 western, Fort Apache, 
paints for us, in the person of the arrogant, ambitious, single-minded Colonel 
Thursday, one of the most literally deadly commanding officers in American 
fiction. Where the earlier films differ from the later ones, however, is in their 
tendency to rationalize paternal failure, not by representing it as any less serious 
(given that it resulted in the slaughter of almost an entire regiment, the father's 
fault in Fort Apache can hardly be considered a trivial one), but by strategies of 
framing. It should be noted that this isn't simply a matter of intent The intent is 
as likely to be exculpatory in fifties treatments of this theme as it was in the forties. 
If it is ideologically revealing that Thursday's "mistake" is repackaged after the 
fact as heroism, it is equally notable that Queeg's errors are amended in a post-
trial coda that represents him as a good and brave man brought low by a 
combination of battle stress and disloyalty. Both films, in other words, provide 
a last-minute exoneration of their technically guilty father figures. The difference 
is in the way this is received. Whether one views Thursday's canonization 
negatively as a whitewashing for the sake of the hierarchy or positively as an 
appropriation for the sake of the community,61 one thing that can be stipulated is 
that the tone of the picture as a whole—its respect for its hero, its emphasis on the 
redeeming feature of personal courage—is at least nominally consistent with this 
retrospective mythicization. The same cannot be said of The Caine Mutiny. At 
least in the film version of this story (in the novel, says William Darby, the bad 
son is vilified more thoroughly than the bad father62) there is such an extreme 
dissonance between what we are told and what we have seen for ourselves that 
we are unable to reconcile the two. What sticks with us at the end, moreover, is 
not the party line, not even a sense of having to resist the party line, but the image 
of Bogart's Queeg—twitching, hysterical, vindicative—and the memory of the 
satisfaction we felt in the courtroom scene when, against all odds, his accusers 
were corroborated by his own lack of control. Regardless of intent, then, in 1954 
we simply do not believe the face-(or institution-)saving coda any more. Subse-
quent to this, even the pretence begins to disappear. In Mister Roberts, the bad 
father (James Cagney as a wonderfully cynical and malicious poor-boy-risen-to-
a-position-of-power) is so much a given—so much the predictable extension of 
a predictably inimical system—that we are not even surprised by the meaningless 
death of the would-be-better son (a kamikaze plane catches him drinking coffee 
in the wardroom during his first engagement after getting his long awaited 
transfer to active duty). 
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The fifties war film was thus a spawning ground for the public version of the 
bad dad. Perhaps, on the other hand, it's unreasonable to use such a label for this 
last couple of examples. Both The Caine Mutiny and Mister Roberts are set on 
non-combat vessels in the backwater of the war. Far from anomalous, however, 
this dissociation of the experience of war from the experience of batde is a key 
step in the de-authorization process. As long as the fiction focuses on the activity 
of fighting, and especially on the action of the individual fighter, it is difficult to 
discredit the idea that the patriarchal imperative is a heroic one. Once the 
immediacy recedes, however, what we are left with is simply the image of 
arbitrary and dehumanizing regimentation. We should not be surprised, then, that 
so many of the more memorable fifties war fictions took place far removed from 
the enemy lines. Given the aforementioned ambivalence about conformity, it is 
almost predictable that the popular imagination of the day, as Peter Biskind notes, 
should be fixated less on the contest with "Nazis or Commies" than on "the deadly 
combat between the individual and society, represented by the army."63 Viewed 
from this perspective, Captain Queeg is not just a flawed individual; he expresses 
toasignificantdegreealarge and growing suspicion that the idea of "fatherness"— 
indeed, the whole not-to-be-questioned constellation of goals and values that 
characterized the progressivist patriarchy—was a suspect one. Hence the anti-
war picture; hence, too, one would venture, the decade-long cycle of anti-success 
films like The Harder They Fall or The Sweet Smell of Success. If the biological 
father was ambiguous in the fifties, his worldly equivalent, the self-made 
millionaire or high-flying tycoon was explicitly and almost without exception 
either unhappy or vicious.64 
Exacerbating this rejection of paternal values was an even more pointed 
rejection of the paternal role. It is significant, for instance, that Jack Warden, the 
good sergeant who represents the middle ground between top down corruption 
and bottom up alienation in From Here to Eternity, refuses in the end, despite his 
recognition of the need for his skills and even more his integrity, to become an 
officer. It is also significant that this character and this decision are played up 
more fully in the film version than in the novel.65 Whatever connection the fifties 
felt with the son betrayed, the thing that focused the real anxieties of the period 
was the suggestion, more subversive by far, that the bad father was not simply a 
fluke who could be replaced by a newer model. Indeed, even the good father was 
tainted by now. Read positively, The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit may simply 
be taken as modeling a healthy response to the pressures of modern society. When 
Tom Rath makes "the decision to give up the entrepreneurial ideal of unlimited 
aspiration in favor of a balance between work and privatized familial happi-
ness"—when he turns down the opportunity to become the corporate heir-
apparent, despite his admiration for the boss-father himself—this "is not merely 
a revolt against the old," says Elizabeth Long, but "an accommodation to the 
constraints of the new."66 For present purposes, however, it seems more useful 
to reverse the order of that sentence. Accommodation notwithstanding, Rath's 
decision is a revolt against the old. Like Jack Warden, he makes a conscious 
14 
choice not to join the ranks of the fathers. Considering the sad state of the boss ' s 
"real" family, both here and elsewhere (it is notable that the captain's marriage 
in From Here to Eternity is both sterile and loveless), it is clear that the public 
patriarch, traditionally celebrated as the cornerstone of the common weal, has by 
the fifties become a seriously compromised figure. 
The decade replays this refusal in many forms. The gunfighter—a popular 
hero-type during the period—is considered by most critics to be other by 
definition.67 When Shane rides out of town at the end of the movie, however, away 
from the cozy home and the ready-made family, it is more than possible, 
considering contiguous developments, that far from "exceptional" he is simply 
acting out a communal fantasy. If true, this would go far to explain the almost 
complete dissociation of fatherness and satisfaction in the fictions of the period. 
And not just in the fictions. One might, for instance, note here the late-decade 
public fascination, entirely disproportionate to either the size or the importance 
of the movement, with those archetypal drop-outs, the Beats.68 To be fair, on the 
other hand, one would also have to note the quite contrary implications of the 
television of the time. 
The fifties domestic sitcom, says Ella Taylor, depicted "a universe in which 
mild sibling quarrels were quickly but fairly adjudicated by sage, kindly parents 
equipped with endless reserves of time and patience Taken together, these 
shows proposed family life as a charming excursion into modernity, but resting 
on the unshakeable stability of tradition."69 Clearly this description is discrepant 
with the picture we have inferred from film melodrama. Are we, then, simply 
dealing with another one of the paradoxes mentioned in the introduction? In a 
way, perhaps. For obvious practical reasons, television fictions were substan-
tially more conservative than those produced by other media during the period. 
This shouldn ' t, on the other hand, be taken to mean that the subversion wasn ' t still 
there. On the small as on the large screen the father in fact lost considerable 
ground during the fifties. In some cases the deflation was quite explicit. A staple 
of programs like "Ozzie and Harriet" and "The Honeymooners," for instance, was 
(in Clifford Clark's words) making fun of "the inept father whose harebrained 
ideas would have wrecked the family were it not for the common sense and hard 
work of the wife."70 Even in series like "Father Knows Best" and "Leave It to 
Beaver," however, which seem on the surface to offer an unequivocal affirmation 
of patriarchy, the father, like the good dad of film melodrama, is covertly 
disadvantaged simply by virtue of his "position." 
It is this covert operation that perhaps best summarizes the fifties view of the 
father. The real strike against Jim Anderson and Ward Cleaver is that they are 
never allowed to meet us on their own turf. We know they have jobs, and it is clear 
from the details of the mis-en-scène that they do well enough in them to provide 
their families with all the normal middle-class advantages. The only time we tend 
to see them, though, is at home, in the traditional territory of moms and kids, 
confronting, reacting against, and all too often mishandling traditional household 
problems and crises. Even without explicit character flaws, then, they are 
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situationally diminished, domesticated into a faintly comic ineffectuality.71 
Much the same might be said of the "real" father during this period. The stress 
on conformity, the valorization of private satisfaction over public success, the 
media emphasis on "togetherness"—however these trends might be rationalized 
individually, what they accomplished collectively was a total recoding of the 
erstwhile independentmale. "In theory," says Oakley,"'togetherness,meantthat 
young couples now spent more time together than married people had in the past 
and that family roles were becoming less differentiated... But it was the [man] 
who was supposed to have changed the most. Magazines ran article after article 
on the new husband, who was shown working... around the house [or] attending 
classes with his wife on childbirth and childcare."72 Never mind the truth we all 
know, that men didn't "really" became equal partners in homemaking—it is clear 
from such materials that the image of masculinity purveyed during this period, by 
experts as by filmmakers, was far removed from patriarchal norms. It is also clear 
that the discrepancy catalyzed more than a little uneasiness. Considering the 
extent to which comedy is supposed to document communal anxieties, one might, 
for instance, take note of the fact that so many of the men in the comic strips of 
the fifties were shorter than, and bullied by, their wives.73 The sense of threat 
carried by these representations is palpable.74 It is worth remembering, on the 
other hand, that humor does more than simply manage ambivalence—it also acts 
subversively, to express disreputable wishes. However negatively the negative 
image of the father may seem to have been viewed, therefore, it may be seen as 
a necessary first step in developing a more positive counter-ideology privileging 
the feminine. 
Mothers and Daughters 
I made mention earlier of the strong female figures who emerged from forties 
cinema. I also mentioned that their independence was a qualified one. There has 
been ample discussion, especially among feminist film critics, of the ways in 
which, their relative vitality notwithstanding, these women are textually subor-
dinated to the patriarchal order. Mothers are made to appear as monsters of lack 
or excess.75 Daughters bond preferentially with their fathers.76 Career women are 
punished for their presumption.77 Romantics are punished for their desire.78 The 
innocent and unwary are attacked by madness or madmen.79 What the plot 
begins, the structure completes. A common strategy is the imposition of an 
extrinsically validated discursive hierarchy. In Mildred Pierce, for instance, the 
privilege is established both visually and diagetically. Just as the heroine herself 
is diminished/contained by the shadowy, noir-coded interior of the police station, 
her "story," carried in flashbacks, is distanced and contained by the anchoring 
present interludes dominated by the male detective, with his unsettling gaze and 
superior knowledge.80 Despite—or more likely because of—her worldly success, 
then, the independent female is out-spoken (pun intended) in her own text. This 
is a common circumstance in forties fictions. What the decade gives with one 
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hand it takes away with the other. Even the femme fatale, as Molly Haskell points 
out, is "exposed" as a male fantasy.81 
What, we might ask, stimulated such strenuous defensiveness? Considering 
the tone of some of the more extreme contemporaneous discourses on women— 
Philip Wylie's Generation ofVipers, for instance, with its "discovery" of the later 
much-bruitedphenomenonof'momism/'orLundberg'sandFarnham'sdiatribe 
on female maladjustment in Modern Woman: The Lost Sex82—it is clearly not 
enough to invoke something as neutral and dispassionate as "the times." The 
image of woman produced by Hollywood during its classic period, says Christine 
Gledhill, must be read not simply "as a reflection of an economically constituted 
problem—the post-war impulse . . . to punish the independent female... as a 
reflex of the economy's need to push women out of production back into the 
home—but also as a crisis in the function of that image of defining male 
identity."83 What triggered that crisis? The fact is, if the forties film heroine was 
a subject of the patriarchal order, she was also, and in some ways more important, 
its agent.*4 The maternal role was particularly crucial here, of course. Due to the 
association of women with domesticity, and of domesticity with constraint, the 
mother has historically been ceded a strong regulatory role in America—and 
viewed negatively because of it.85 It's hardly surprising, then, that a period like 
the forties, with its legacy of New Deal social imperatives and even more its 
wartime prioritization of collective over personal interests, that the mother, as the 
symbol of the most oppressive aspects of the state,86 would be first feared and 
second, in retaliation, denied. 
Far from abating with the coming of peace and prosperity, the mood 
darkened even more after the war. Molly Haskell finds a "Gothic," almost 
schizophrenic aspect to the period. Especially during the latter half of the decade, 
she says, "there is a feeling of disaffection [in many films], a glimpse of criminal 
tracks running parallel to ordinary society not, as in the thirties, with the option 
of jumping back into the mainline, but continuing forever alongside. The image 
of woman," she continues, "takes its shadings from [this] general Zeitgeist"91 
With what results? On the face of it, mostly negative ones. Especially after Cold 
War rhetoric began exacerbating private anxieties (and clearly it was significant 
here, as mentioned earlier, that political subversion was commonly associated 
with sexual deviancy88), defense mechanisms worked overtime. This did not, on 
the other hand, mean that maternal figures became even more monstrous. 
Misogyny, thanks to successful management strategies, began to give way to 
condescension. The mother, no longer allowed to be threatening, was contained 
or subdued. Domestic melodramas for the most part simply defined her out of the 
picture.89 In films like Night of the Hunter or Ruby Gentry, for instance, she is 
important only for her absence. Even in cases like East of Eden or Rebel Without 
a Cause where she still plays an actively inimical role, qua person she is so alien, 
so impervious in her antipathy, that she seems more like a force of nature than a 
"real," even problematic (like the father), part of the family.90 All in all, despite 
the social emphasis on mothering during this decade (which was, of course, in 
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itself another "containment" strategy91), the image of the actual mother becomes 
very shadowy. Even on television, in fact, that purported last bastion of 
domesticity, what we see in the main is a process of de-realization. The 
henpecked hubbies that Arthur Hough notes in the earlier years92 do, it is true, still 
carry traces of the forties fear-formation, but by mid-decade the mother had by 
and large dwindled into a fencepost figure, theoretically positive perhaps (we'll 
return to this later93), but in practice peripheral to both the action and the emotional 
dynamics of the situation.94 Nor did the process stop here. Within a few years, 
programs like "Bachelor Father," "The Andy Griffith Show," and "A Family 
Affair" would delete her entirely, displacing her duties onto either servants or— 
more significantly—wifeless (that is, un- or de-domesticated) males.95 By the end 
of the fifties, the mother was hardly even a function any more. In light of such 
developments the deflation of the patriarch we noted above could perhaps be 
better seen as spearheading a general deflation of the social parent. As an 
interesting sidelight here one might note that after 1959, Tarzan movies quietly 
dropped not only Jane but the apeman's erstwhile son.96 
Fifties moms, then, don't fare much better than fifties dads. The question is, 
of course, what does this imply for our broader project? Certainly the data so far 
would seem to do little to support the claims I made in the last section about the 
subversive implications of familial role changes. If mothers in fifties fictions 
appear primarily to reflect the long-term effects of forties reaction, however, 
other feminine figures look more clearly ahead to the sixties. Again we have to 
step back a little to get the whole picture. I refer the reader once more to Haskell's 
description of the late forties Zeitgeist. General bleakness notwithstanding, at the 
heart of this cultural configuration, and accounting for much of its dis-ease, was 
a phenomenon that would ultimately plant the seeds of subsequent revision. With 
increasing frequency over this period the film heroine begins to be portrayed, not 
as a mother or a mother-to-be—not, indeed, as any kind of social exemplar—but 
as an antithesis to maternity, in asocial and specifically sexual terms.97 Not 
merely the vamp but the "good" woman, in other words, becomes identified in the 
late forties almost entirely with and by her desire.98 
At first sight this doesn't seem like a particularly liberating development. On 
the face of it, indeed, the strategy would seem to offer the greatest benefits to the 
beleaguered male. By "exposing" the deviancy of feminineness, for one thing, 
it provides a rationale for misogyny without necessitating too close a look at the 
roots of masculine insecurity. Even more critical, by dissociating the female from 
her sources of both legitimacy and power, it makes it easier to distance or punish 
her. In symbolic terms, sex even provides the means of chastisement. Here the 
medicalization motif so noticeable in the late forties/early fifties discourse on 
women99 plays a key role. In film after film throughout these years, as Doane 
notes, sexuality—the characterizing property of the new woman—is associated 
by means of its "treatment" (both literally and figuratively) with mental or 
emotional dysfunctions, with physical illness, and even with death. There's a 
catch to all this, however, and it's here that we find the roots to the counterstrain 
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I mentioned above. While it is perhaps inarguable that de-domestication renders 
the female more vulnerable, it is important to note that it also makes her more 
dangerous. Hence film noir. If this genre takes great pains to code women as 
other, thus reasserting the norm-sustaining fact of difference,100 in its entrapped 
heroes and duplicitous kindred it also models a crucial derangement of the 
patriarchal family.101 It is at this place—poised between power and punishment— 
that we find the disaffiliated heroine at the dawn of the fifties. 
Where does she go from there? Into oblivion, many would say. I already 
mentioned the erasure of women from the sixties popular narrative. In fact, 
though, this datum is misleading. If we look a little more closely, it becomes clear 
that the disappearance of the forties-style strong woman from fifties fictions was 
neither as simple nor as negative as it looks "on the face of it." What needs to be 
recognized here is that an entrenched ambivalence affects almost every text of the 
era. Even the most overtly misogynistic discourses—the hard-boiled detective 
story102; the scatterbrained wife variant of domestic sitcom103; most striking of all, 
perhaps, the aforementioned B-movie "creature feature" with its conventional 
attribution of threat to either unbridled nature or its equivalent, "female" 
libidinality104—while clearly attesting to patriarchal reaction, also, if only by 
virtue of their hysteria, document a recognition of the power of the returning 
repressed. It's a question of which "side" of the picture one chooses to emphasize. 
In the same way that the ostensibly tough-guy Mike Hammer can be taken as a 
"hom(m)osexual" who is terrified of his own repressed feminineness,105 for 
instance, so Gracie and Lucy and their ilk can be read as either demeaning images 
or empowering ones. How? Even leaving aside the anti-social implications of 
their sheer wilfulness, the illogic and fractured discourse with which these "imp" 
types106 continually confound male rationality are not just failures of mental 
competence but clearly represent a successful cover for that other "irrational" 
force, sexuality. Though these examples are all in some sense counter-texts, a 
similar quarrying can also recuperate the apparently negative domesticating 
strategies of mainstream fictions during the period. 
The first step in this process, obviously, is to determine what exactly these 
strategies comprise. Many critics would claim that the most significant develop-
ment over the course of the period was the replacement of the femme fatale with 
the girl-next-door. Most of those same critics would also assert that the trend was 
a pernicious one. Just as the ritualized dating behavior of the later decade can be 
seen as a means of controlling sexual experimentation among teenagers,107 they 
would say, the increasing emphasis on youthfulness and virginity in women— 
more extremely, the shift of interest from women to girls—was a tool or at least 
a consequence of patriarchal repression.108 The facts in question would seem to 
be indubitable. Despite this, the reading simply doesn't work beyond a certain 
point. The real problem is its failure to account for other, equally obvious and 
strikingly contradictory, aspects of the period. What do we do, for instance, with 
the pointed implication of films Hkc Picnic that sexual repression—especially in 
its female aspect, the spinster—was at best pathetic and at worst unwholesome?109 
19 
Even more problematic, how do we explain the continued and even increasing 
popularity throughout the period of the love-goddess type?110 And what about the 
Playboy phenomenon?111 Whatever else happened during the fifties, it is clear 
from indicators like these that sex was neither condemned nor "contained," as the 
repression theory implies, but instead underwent a process of exoneration. One 
way of accomplishing this was by playing up the redemptive powers of love.112 
Another, and more important for the subject at hand, was a kind of rustication. 
The key sememe here was Marilyn Monroe. In marked contrast to the 
venality of the film noir sexpot, Marilyn represented desire in its most beneficent, 
unthreatening, animal form. As articulated by Marilyn, in other words, sex was 
no longer deforming but natural. This shift—this single term, in fact—contains 
the key to the whole period. At least in America113 naturalness is consensually 
associated with the essential feminine. Insofar as the fifties public identified with 
the love goddess, then, they were also necessarily identifying with a stance or 
mode that was at least formally opposed to patriarchy. The question is, of course, 
whether identification is really the proper word to use in a case like this. It must 
be acknowledged that there are a great many critics who would say that the 
operative relationship with regard to Marilyn was not empathy but appropriation. 
It is notable, on the other hand, that one of the most derogatory discussions of the 
Monroe cult—Michael Wood's—speaks of the phenomenon as signaling a kind 
of fake-cum-wishful communal coming-into-innocence.114 Cynicism notwith-
standing (Wood himself is concerned primarily with the exploitative potential of 
what he calls the "Calypso" role), what is most significant about this statement 
is its offhanded documentation of incipient primitivism. If it is undeniable that 
at least part of Marilyn's appeal was rooted in her capacity to allay male anxieties 
(by playing up both her naivete and her accessibility, says Richard Dyer, films like 
The Seven Year Itch not only countered but actually deconstructed the erstwhile 
threat of feminine sexuality115), it is also clear that the deculturalization strategy 
had the reciprocal effect of unharnessing and by implication revalorizing exactly 
those elements of excessive feminineness116 that, according to feminist critics like 
Mary Ann Doane, the forties text was so concerned to contain.117 
Accepting this revision, it now is possible to read the late fifties popularity 
of tomboy and teeny-bopper heroines like "Gidget" and "Tammy"118 as no more 
nor less than an extension or product of a general trend toward the rehabilitation 
of the libidinal. If innocence was the only guarantee that sex would not be used 
for ulterior (i.e., "unnatural") ends, then the younger and less sophisticated the 
female, the better. It is important to be clear, on the other hand, that it is the 
potentiality of such figures, not simply their purity, that makes them desirable. In 
this respect one might note, for instance, that the "bad girls" of the period, like Liz 
Taylor's character in Butterfield S, are in general condemned not because they 
have sex outside of marriage but because they do so for the wrong reasons: to get 
money or possessions or social status. One might also note that the ingenue who 
falls authentically, out of genuine passion—as inA Summer Place™—is virtually 
always treated sympathetically. Far from a defense of celibacy, what we derive 
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from vehicles like this is the message that sex is simply too important to be trifled 
with. From such a viewpoint even the cult of virginity can be viewed as a means, 
not of repressing, but of exaggerating the momentousness of the sexual act, 
transforming it from a merely social marker into a numinous, even religious 
experience. It is notable in this regard, as Haskell points out, that even in the most 
clichéed of the late-fifties sex comedies the virginal status of the hard-to-get 
heroine is more typically attributable to accident than to moral conviction. From 
films like Pillow Talk, she says, "the image of Doris Day we have somehow 
accepted is that of a forty-year-old virgin defending her maidenhead into a ripe 
old age. On the contrary, though she begins, usually, as a sexually backward 
young woman, she overcomes inhibitions and covers lightyears in sex education. 
Unabashedly puritanical... [when it comes to] drink and dirty words... she is 
[nevertheless] ready to give herself to the man she loves. What prevents her is not 
her coyness but the plot's."120 
The picture that emerges when we look at such unconsidered qualifiers, if not 
diametrically opposed to, at least diverges importantly from, the conventional 
ideological reading of this decade as simply conservative. If it is true, as the 
feminists claim, that the sanitization of the fifties heroine resulted in a net loss of 
power, it is also true that the process of disempowerment, in keeping with our 
initial predictions, was concomitant with, and diagnostic of, arehabilitation of her 
most essential general properties—that is (and here one thinks not only of the no-
longer-mercenary mistress but also of the no-longer-domineering mother), those 
properties connected with her biological rather than her social being. From the 
feminist viewpoint this is not, by and large, a positive development. It is notable 
that the most—indeed, one might almost say the only—potent women to be found 
sixties television households were either pastoralized ("The Beverly Hillbillies," 
"Petticoat Junction," "Green Acres") or magical ("I Dream of Jeannie," "Be-
witched," "The Munsters").121 In the vast majority of cases, however, on large or 
small screen, the need to divest the female of her social taint left little more than 
a cypher. The consequences of this particular combination of facts will be 
considered further in the next section. 
Brothers and Sisters 
If the parent was no longer a suitable role model, then common sense would 
suggest that the obvious heir to fifties affections must have been the child. On the 
face of it there is ample hard evidence to support this supposition. One of the most 
telling data is the much documented post-war growth of a separate youth 
culture.122 Though centered on and stimulated by the burgeoning of new forms 
of music, over the course of the fifties the teen movement changed the whole face 
of the American popular media. Can we take this to "prove" a general valorization 
of juvenility ? Clearly pertinent here is the question raised by numerous commen-
tators as to whether the phenomenon in question represented an authentic grass 
roots development or was simply a synthetic product concocted by clever 
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businessmen to take advantage of the growing adolescent market. Due to the 
quite evident degree of commercialization to which it was later subjected, rock 
V roll has been a favored target of this kind of critique.123 Other kinds of 
merchandise, however—from film to fashion—are also commonly read as less 
indicative of youthful desire than of corporate greed. "Teens experiment with 
tastes, and exploiters carefully scan fan clubs for new trends," says Robert 
Shayon, "but they also shrewdly feed back stimuli into the young groups and help 
to develop marketable trends."124 The image invoked here of conscious manipu-
lation is not only a frequent but an ofttimes justifiable one. Does this mean the 
whole thing was a fake? I think not. That "exploiters" were quick to jump on the 
bandwagon does not imply that they invented it in the first place. It is notable, as 
Oakley points out,125 that there was virtually no distinctive youth music at the 
beginning of the decade. It is also notable that rock 'n' roll was at first strenuously 
resisted by mainstream interests. Only after it was successfully promoted by 
small independent companies like Sun Records, Elvis's original label, did the 
major producers decide that it would be good business to change their tune. Far 
from contriving it, "the industry was caught napping" by the unprecedented 
popularity of the new music, says Andrew Ross. Entrepreneurs and disc jockeys 
may have '"discovered' the teenage taste for R&B, and helped to make it 
nationally popular: they did not 'create it"126 There seems no reason to believe 
that the same can't be said of other aspects of teen culture, no matter how 
commercial they seem. At the very least, then, I think we can stipulate that youth 
became both a more distinct and a more important category during the period. 
More contentiously, I would also argue that it accrued more "real" social power. 
One of the best indicators vis-a-vis the question of agency is the imaging of 
teens in general culture. It is axiomatic by now that rock V roll was viewed by 
adults in its early years as an affront not merely to aesthetic sensibilities but to 
morality.127 What is perhaps not so widely recognized, however, is the extent to 
which this particular opposition reflected a deep-seated concern about, even fear 
of, the young people themselves. This anxiety was not, to be sure, without some 
foundation. "Between 1948 and 1953," notes Oakley, "the number of juveniles 
. . . charged with crimes increased by 45 percent, and it was estimated that for 
every [one]... brought into court there were at least five who had not been caught. 
It was especially disturbing that juvenile crimes were committed by organized 
gangs that roamed—and seemed to control—the streets of many of the larger 
cities."128 While striking, however, such statistics may also be misleading taken 
out of context. Crime rates aside, the fact of the matter is that most Americans 
lived in locales safely segregated from the urban areas where the problem was 
largely localized. Most Americans, indeed, had never seen a real "J.D." The 
paranoia so widely noted by contemporaneous as well as subsequent commenta-
tors derived, then, not from the reality of, but from the public discourse about, 
delinquency: the journalistic scaremongering, the endless stream of expert 
opinion, the cautionary fictional depictions.129 And I do mean cautionary. 
Looking back from the eighties we tend to think of teen flicks as both harmless 
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and conventional. The view from the fifties, however, bodies forth a quite 
different picture. The young hoods of Blackboard Jungle, for instance, are no 
Ferris Buellers; they pose real threats to the property and even the physical safely 
of their adult "keepers."130 It is telling, I think, as Joseph Reed points out, that this 
story is conveyed from the teacher's rather than the students' vantage point131 
One thing we can infer from the sheer disproportion of the "fuss about delin-
quency"132 is that the fifties image of the "bad son," in marked contrast to more 
recent versions, was not just a wishful juvenile fantasy but expressed the feelings 
of the public at large. 
Youth, then, was coded not merely as different but as dangerous in the 
fifties—just as woman was. It is significant in this regard that the only notable 
variant on the "feminine" movie monster during the period was the teen one. 
Films like / Was a Teenage Werewolf not only express adolescent anxieties about 
changing bodies and social roles, as Reed contends133; they also attribute to the 
child-hero a real, and historically anomalous, ability to cause harm. One can't 
help thinking of the similarly covert empowerment of women not just in horror 
vehicles but even more, albeit briefly, in genres like film noir. There are some 
important differences in the two cases, however. For one thing, the bad boy was 
never viewed as negatively as the bad woman. Quite the contrary, in fact. Even 
early in the decade there is an evident urge both to exonerate and to normalize him. 
Some pictures—notably those starring cult heroes like Marlon Brando or James 
Dean—achieve this simply by focusing their attention on a single complex and 
sympathetic character.134 Others, cashing in on the current fascination with 
unhappy families, make his misbehavior a direct consequence of parental 
neglect135 Dean's "Rebel Without a Cause" is the most celebrated but far from 
the only fifties bad boy who only needs a little T.L.C. Even "J.D." films, while 
quite clear about the gang's lawlessness, rarely make their protagonists seem as 
absolutely other as film noir does. In some cases, indeed, it is society that is 
portrayed as alien. The bikers of The Wild One, for instance, though rude and 
destructive, are less spiteful and certainly less deliberate in their violence than the 
vigilante band of town fathers. Beside the cold-blooded, hypocritical righteous-
ness of the latter, in fact, Brando's anomie seems justified, even admirable. All 
things considered, this was probably the most notable feature marking off the bad 
boy from his feminine counterpart: the fact that his dangerousness was often 
imaged, at least covertly, as positive. Sympathy wasn't the only thing that 
separated them, however. More important in the long run was the fact that where 
women, as noted, lost their potency over the course of the decade, the bad boy 
reigned well into the sixties. 
How, in the light of concomitant patterns, are we to interpret this apparent 
inversion? Many, especially feminist critics see it simply as capping or confirm-
ing the eclipse of the feminine that began in the fifties.136 Far from subversive, 
the bad boy, according to this view, is an avatar of patriarchy, continuing and 
deepening his fathers' oppressive opposition to women. There is some textual 
support for such a reading. Peter Biskind, for instance, notes the unusual number 
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of late fifties/early sixties films in which "sex-starved [older] women lusted after 
young studs"137: one could easily read this thematization as an allegory of the 
battle for both social and symbolic supremacy between the old maternal exemplar 
and the new disaffiliated youth. The problem, once again, is the recalcitrance of 
the material: as with those supposedly pro-patriarchal texts we examined in the 
first section, if one looks just a little more closely at the thing-in-itself, the lines— 
particularly the battle lines—begin to shift and blur a little. It is notable that in 
the classic 1950 precursor to this late-decade trend—Sunset Boulevard—the 
older woman, a superannuated movie star who is coded as a combination of the 
problematic forties career woman and the noir sexual predator, is less clearly a 
victim than her successors. It is also notable (marking the difference a decade 
makes) that in this case it is the young stud who is defeated—killed by her in a 
jealous rage. Even this early, however, and despite the denouement, there is no 
doubt whatsoever where the film's sympathies lie. The aging actress—vain, 
deluded, false to the core after a lifetime of trading on artifice and insincerity— 
represents the full dead weight of history and its stultifying effect on vital youth. 
The wording is important here, because I want to make clear what the film makes 
clear: that Norma Desmond (and I think we can extend this description to many 
of those other stud-hungry spinsters and their ilk138) is condemned by the narrative 
not because she represents woman against man, but because she represents the old 
order—culture against nature. The implications of this are, to say the least, 
provocative. Like the young gardener who nurtures the rich and repressed widow 
back to life in All That Heaven Allows,139 the bad boy who wanders into town in 
films like Picnic and The Fugitive Kindis not woman ' s antithesis but her alter ego, 
her competition, at times even her ideal self.140 
This recoding of the young male was one of the most striking phenomena of 
the fifties. It wasn't only the new breed of actor, with his animal magnetism and 
overt emotionality, who had a distinctly androgynous streak. Long before James 
Dean became an icon, the young people of the nation had taken up as their 
standard-bearer one Holden Caulfield, the irreverent young hero of J.D. Salinger ' s 
much-banned novel, The Catcher in the Rye, a figure who, in Peter Filene's 
words, though clearly rebellious (no one ever mounted a more concerted attack 
on adult "phoniness"), "rebelled tenderly, compassionately, [in a way] more 
feminine than masculine."141 There is a sense, in fact, in which the whole of teen 
culture during the fifties was derivatively "feminine." The key, as one might 
predict by now, was the property or profession of natureness. It is not coincidental 
that the primary progenitors of rock V roll—"race" music (R&B) and country 
and western—both have strong conventional primitivistic associations.142 Con-
sidering the context, in fact, we could almost say that rock *n* roll managed to 
combine the numen of the cowboy and the noble savage in one improbable 
package. And that's only the least of it. The real secret to the "success" of fifties 
rock—indeed, the single factor that came by the end of the decade to be popularly 
identified as summarizing both the nature of, and the "trouble" with, the 
American teenager—was sex. If the explicit lyrics of R&B were cleaned up for 
24 
white consumption, there was still plenty of inexplicit libidinality in the pounding 
up-beat rhythms of the new music, not to mention the body-language of its 
performers.143 "Perhaps Jeff Greenfield, a member of this first generation of rock 
V roll fans, expressed it best in his No Peace, No Place? says Oakley. '"Each 
night, sprawled on my bed on Manhattan's Upper West Side, I would listen to the 
world that Alan Freed created... a world of unbearable sexuality and celebration, 
a world of citizens under sixteen, in a constant state of joy or sweet sorrow.'"144 
It is clear from this quote that the youth of the day felt their culture set them apart 
from—and thus tacitly against—their parents. It is equally clear from our 
observations in earlier parts of this paper about the linkages made between nature, 
sex and the feminine that the means by which this dissociation was accomplished 
entailed not merely the marking of a generation gap, not merely the rejection of 
fatherness, but a full-scale realignment with modes of being or feeling more 
conventionally assigned to woman.145 
There's no accident in any of this, of course. In America rebellion by 
definition belongs on nature's side of the fence.146 Simply showing an urge to 
rebel would thus already predispose youth toward feminineness. Or perhaps the 
urge to rebel was simply the byproduct of a more general feminization. Whatever 
the sequence, the bottom line is that the social subversiveness of the fifties bad boy 
was (ironically enough) defined by and dependent upon a subversion of his 
ostensibly immutable masculinity. Why, though, aboy? The reader will no doubt 
have noticed the biased gendering of pronouns in a section entitled "Brothers and 
Sisters." And this last observation exacerbates the problem. If feminineness is 
indeed the key to the new empowerment, why don't we see more potent females 
in the fictions of the fifties? The previous section already answered this. More 
deeply implicated in patriarchy than her brothers, the American heroine (and it is 
notable that this term already carries a burden of social responsibility, a de facto 
positioning on the side of "right," which is entirely absent from the masculine 
version of the word) is pre-coded as an opponent of "liberty." The only way to 
eradicate this stigma, as we have seen, is to detach her from her erstwhile 
conventional, and especially domestic, character. Once divested of her social 
powers, unfortunately, she also loses the potential to play any kind of anti-social 
role. Inpartthisisduetothenecessitiesofthedivestmentitself. Toberedeemed, 
the heroine has to be good. If she's good, on the other hand, she's not interesting 
anymore—not in a period of burgeoning primitivism anyway. One of the reasons 
we are satisfied with the denouement of SunsetBoulevard, for instance, is the fact 
that the "nice girl" who is set against the conniving older woman in the contest 
for William Holden's soul is simply not dynamic enough to seem even a suitable 
mate for the man, let alone having the charisma to stand in his place. Merely 
because she is nice, she lacks both his edge and his ambivalence—the very 
qualities that comprise and define his subversiveness. To render the female 
eligible for election to the ranks of the anti-heroes, then, is almost perforce to 
render her unsuitable. That's the first problem. The other is more basic still. 
Paradoxically, it is only the male who can thrive in those times and landscapes that 
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Americans identify with a state of nature. Hence the seemingly quite unjust fact 
that the free spirits of the "feminine" sixties—real as well as fictional147—were 
virtually all masculine. 
It becomes necessary at this point to introduce a qualifier into the argument. 
One of the dangers in this kind of essay is the blurring of the categories of "real" 
and fictional. From what I have said in this section it would be easy to see the 
privileging of youth in terms solely of its effects on and utilization by flesh and 
blood adolescents. It is true, of course, that life copies art. It is also true, however, 
that fictional representations, even realistic ones, are never entirely mimetic. 
Especially when it comes to the imaging of so highly mythicized an entity as 
"family," it is always necessary to think in terms of psycho-drama, not merely 
reportage. In this case, for instance, it must be made clear that the youth cult was 
not a phenomenon reserved for the young but a product of the broader popular 
imagination. Our comments on rock 'n' roll notwithstanding, there is some 
indication, in fact, that teenagers themselves were far less constructing than 
constructed during this period—a creation, not of Madison Avenue (I will still 
stand firm on this), but of the general public mood. Certainly this is the impression 
they gave contemporaneous observers. Sociologist Talcott Parsons talked about 
their "compulsive conformity" to the peer group.148 Others, even more damn-
ingly, spoke of their conformity to the values of their elders. "The conservatism 
of the college generation prevailed throughout the decade," says Oakley. "In a 
study [published]... in 1951, Time magazine noted that 'the most startling thing 
about the younger generation is its silence'... [In 1953] Newsweek reported that 
students were hardworking, ambitious conformists who looked forward to secure 
jobs and a happy married life Similar collegiate characteristics were reported 
in a 1955 study by David Riesman... [and] in 1957, when The Nation surveyed 
college and university professors about what their students were reading and 
thinking."149 Whence, then, came that omnipresent image of rebellion? From the 
air? Perhaps. Though it may seem frivolous in a scholarly text, this may actually 
be the best way of putting it. We have already mentioned the middle class 
appropriation of the Beat movement.150 Never mind that most of the attention was 
pejorative: the fact that conservative suburbanites could be captivated by a 
phenomenon so antithetical to their accustomed values and lifestyle suggests that 
there was in the population at large a preparedness to be or to value difference. 
We could say the same thing about the obsession with delinquency. It is telling, 
I think, that the most striking bad boy images of the decade were found, not in low-
budget "B" flicks, but in respectable establishment vehicles. Fascination (and no 
matter how great the ambivalence, this was the word for it) with the rebellious 
young anti-hero was a cultural rather than a sub-cultural phenomenon. As was the 
dis-identification with the father. As was the general revalorization of feminine-
ness during the decade. 




Only one thing remains to say on this topic. Intrinsically interesting because of 
what it reflects on the complex interrelations between the social and the symbolic 
deployment of gender categories in America, the foregoing may also contain the 
seeds of an important cautionary tale. The last decade was in many ways a replay 
of the forties. "Miami Vice," Ronald Reagan, postmodern public spaces, an 
obsession with the lives of the rich and the royal, die return of the nuclear family 
to television, of artifice to popular music, and of male monsters to the horror flick, 
the pop-cultural rehabilitation of machismo, militarism and technology—as 
eclectic as they may seem on the surface, these signs of the times are all signs of 
a progressivist mind-set Most important for the subject at hand, the parade of 
strong, interesting female characters across both the large and the small screen 
throughout the eighties was a clear indication of a new concern with the social. 
Beginning with Kramer vsKramer in 1979, vehicles as disparate as "Cagney and 
Lacey," "Kate and Allie," Out of Africa, Places in the Heart, The Witches of 
Eastwick, "Murphy Brown," Desperately Seeking Susan, "Designing Women" 
and Steel Magnolias brought back to the mainstream not only the experience but 
the authority of women. Never mind that feminist critics continued to complain 
about textual and political subordination, the fact is that women's films com-
prised a large proportion of the important films made during the decade. It would 
be tempting to view this as a triumph of feminism if it weren't for one thing—the 
historical parallel.151 If the eighties were the forties, there are already signs abroad 
that the fifties aren't far behind. Most telling, of course, in light of the foregoing, 
was our recent, rather definitive rejection of the political father. But that's only 
the tip of the iceberg. Consider some of the surprises to be found in early nineties 
popular culture. The new working class comedy. The return of the creature 
feature. The new western with its old noble savage. The huge and entirely 
unexpected crossover success of country music. "Northern Exposure." Spike 
Lee. Ross Perot. I could go on.152 Not all the revivals are quite so benign as these, 
unfortunately. It's easy to see the war on drugs—xenophobic, anti-libidinal, 
obsessed with righteousness and disguise—as the cutting edge of a new 
McCarthyism. It's also easy to see the fear of otherness that lurks beneath the 
surface of this so-called war. If we add in the recent upsurge of racism across the 
country, the growing visibility of the anti-pornography and anti-abortion move-
ments, the "justified" misogyny of films like Fatal Attraction and Misery, what 
we have, in fact, is a clear indication that, for good or ill, the returning repressed— 
the face of threat—is again beginning to be construed as feminine. The same 
round, the same mulberry-bush, the same garden path we went down the last time. 
Does this mean that women are doomed to suffer the same erasure? Well, 
that's the sixty-four thousand dollar question, isn ' t it? One would like to hope not. 
The evidence is far from unequivocal, however. One important difference 
between the forties and the eighties was that the latter allowed women a greater 
flexibility of roles and traits. I'm not just talking about getting out of the kitchen 
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here, although this was obviously a step in the right direction. Far more critical 
was the fact that the decade saw females making symbolic inroads into such 
classically male preserves as the buddy film (Outrageous Fortuné) and the hard-
boiled detective novel (Sara Paretsky's V.I. Warshawski). Women not only 
played their traditional, pro-social functions in eighties popular fictions, in other 
words; they also toyed with more oppositional kinds of positioning. One would 
like to think that this might destabilize traditional alignments when it comes to 
fielding a new anti-hero. There's only one fly in the ointment. Just as last time 
it was the hithertofore primary source of the female's worldly power—her 
maternity—that subsequently served as the instrument of her subordination, it is 
possible that the new "working girl" may turn out to be her own worst enemy. 
Think for instance, of the fable we are offered in the film of that name: a nasty, 
selfish, aggressive, unfeminine female executive gives way to a kinder, nicer, 
more domesticated version of the type. This may, alas, turn out to be a true story. 
Just as June Cleaver and Margaret Anderson were done in by their own goodness, 
it is all too easy to imagine the businesswoman of the nineties being idealized into 
symbolic oblivion. So what if she commands a different and larger domain than 
her domestic precursor. When the time comes for the next great escape, she'll still 
be stuck on the side of social responsibility. 
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